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Abstract - According to communicative theories of punishment, legal punishment is pro 
tanto justified because it communicates the censure that offenders deserve for their crimes. 
The aim of this paper is to offer a modest defence for a particular version of communicative 
theories. This version builds on the one that has been advanced by Antony Duff. According 
to him, legal punishment should be understood as a kind of (secular) penitential burden that 
is placed upon offenders to censure them for their crimes, with the aims that they then 
come to repent, reform themselves and reconcile with those whom they have wronged. 
This paper departs from Duff’s version, however, by arguing that the penitential burdens in 
question should be understood more specifically in terms of the amends that offenders 
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ought to do to apologize for their criminal wrongdoings. The final section of this paper then 
attempts to address three potential objections to this revised version of the communicative 
theory.  
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1. Introduction 
According to communicative theories of punishment, as I understand them for the purposes 
of this paper,1 legal punishment is pro tanto justified because it communicates the censure 
that offenders deserve for their crimes.2 As a kind of retributive theory, communicative 
theories therefore seek to explain penal desert in terms of the censure that is deserved. This 
gives communicative theories a prima facie plausibility: whatever else offenders might very 
well deserve in virtue of their crimes, it seems the least problematic and controversial that 
they deserve to be censured for committing them. 
Other kinds of retributive theories seek to explain the nature and the normative 
force of penal desert in other ways. Moore, for example, has a series of arguments based on 
intuitions showing that offenders deserve to suffer in virtue of their wrongdoings;3 while 
Dagger has offered strong arguments against the typical criticisms that are launched against 
fair-play theory, which seeks to explain penal desert in terms of the unfair advantage that 
                                                 
1 See eg Antony Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (OUP 2001); and John Tasioulas, 
‘Punishment and Repentance’ (2006) 81 Philosophy 279. This definition also includes some (self-identified) 
expressivist theories, like Christopher Bennett’s in his The Apology Ritual (CUP 2008).  
2 For the distinction between pro tanto (or ‘tailored’) and all-things-considered justification for punishment, 
see Mitchell Berman, ‘Punishment and Justification’ (2008) 118 Ethics 258, 262-266. 
3 Michael Moore, Placing Blame (OUP 1997) ch 3. 
offenders gain in committing crimes.4 However, if communicative theories can make good 
the task of explicating penal desert in terms of censure, then this makes them at least on 
par with these other retributive theories, or even grants an extra edge over them.5 A 
communicative theory that is successful in this task can then free positive retributivism from 
relying on the various defences of fair-play theory.6 It can also complement and strengthen 
Moore’s intuitive arguments, explain how and why offenders deserve to ‘suffer’ and the 
nature of this deserved ‘suffering’. Furthermore, such a communicative theory can then also 
form the basis for showing what negative retributivism and other non-retributive theories 
(e.g. side-constrained consequentialism) have failed to recognize, when they do not accord 
the normative significance that retributive theories accord to penal desert in the 
justification of punishment. 
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that communicative theories can make good the task of 
explicating penal desert in terms of censure. Insofar as legal punishment involves not just 
censure but also hard treatment, then even if legal punishment qua censure is justifiable 
because the offender deserves to be censured, it does not follow from this that legal 
punishment qua hard treatment is also justifiable just because of it. Call this ‘the problem of 
hard treatment’. 
The aim of this paper is to defend communicative theories in light of the problem of 
hard treatment. In particular, I shall defend a particular version of communicative theories, 
                                                 
4 Richard Dagger, ‘Punishment as Fair Play’ (2008) 14 Res Publica 259. 
5 It also depends on whether there are good arguments for why offenders deserve to be censured. I shall 
put this latter task to one side for the purposes of this paper, but I am more optimistic that communicative 
theories can accomplish this task. 
6 See e.g. Antony Duff, ‘The Incompleteness of ‘Punishment as Fair Play’: A Response to Dagger’ (2008) 14 
Res Publica 277. 
a version that builds on the one that has been advanced by Duff.7 I shall begin by explaining 
in more detail the problem of hard treatment in the next section, before critically discussing 
and eventually rejecting two alternative responses to the problem of hard treatment. I shall 
then consider Duff’s own communicative theory as a response, and argue for a revision to it. 
This takes us to the version of communicative theory that this paper seeks to defend, 
according to which the hard treatment in legal punishment should be more appropriately 
understood in terms of the amends that offenders ought to make to apologize for their 
criminal wrongdoings. It is only a modest defence, as I shall then briefly consider and 
address three potential objections to it at the end. 
Finally, for the purposes of this paper, I shall assume that all crimes are wrongs; 
either they are (in the case of mala in se) wrongs that are prior to legal regulation, or they 
are (in the case of mala prohibita) wrongs as a result of legal regulation.8 I shall therefore be 
using ‘crimes’, ‘criminal wrongdoings’ and ‘wrongs’ interchangeably in this paper. 
 
2. The Problem of Hard Treatment 
Legal punishment, as we normally understand it, involves more than mere censure. It also 
involves hard treatment, something that is painful and burdensome independently of the 
censure itself.9 If censure is understood (for current purposes) as a kind of authoritative 
moral criticism or judgement about what an offender has done, then it seems obvious that 
many, if not all, of the legal punishments we typically have involve some form of hard 
                                                 
7 Most notably in his Punishment, Communication, and Community (n 1) ch 4. 
8 Antony Duff, Answering for Crime (Hart Publishing 2007) 89-93. 
9 According to some (eg Nathan Hanna, ‘Say What? A Critique of Expressive Retributivism’ (2008) 27 Law 
and Philosophy 123, 124-128), legal punishment must also involve the intention or the aim to cause suffering, 
in order to distinguish punitive hard treatment from those that are non-punitive. I am unpersuaded by this, 
mainly for the reasons given by Bill Wringe, in his ‘Must Punishment be Intended to Cause Suffering?’ (2013) 
16 Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 863.   
treatment that goes beyond the pains and burdens inherent in censure.10 A paradigmatic 
example of this is imprisonment, which significantly deprives offenders of many of their 
liberties. Similarly, non-custodial sentences like (temporary) bans from certain places, 
community payback orders and even fines etc., while they might not involve any liberty 
deprivations, still curtail or limit in varying degrees different rights and liberties of those 
who are subject to them. Accordingly, even if legal punishment qua censure is justified 
because the offender deserves to be censured, it does not follow from this that legal 
punishment qua hard treatment is also justified just because of it. 
Of course, hard treatment is a way of communicating censure, but it does not seem 
to be the only way to do so. As Duff asks, “… censure can be expressed by a formal 
conviction, or by a purely symbolic punishment that burdens the offender only insofar as 
she takes its message of censure seriously. Why then should we express it through the kinds 
of hard treatment that our existing penal systems impose – punishments that are 
burdensome or painful independently from their communicative content?”11 Indeed, it is 
normally wrong to inflict pains and burdens on others, unless there are good reasons to do 
so. If formal convictions or purely symbolic punishments can communicate the censure that 
offenders deserve for their crimes, there would be no good reasons to communicate it by 
way of hard treatment. Doing so would simply be wrong. Accordingly, unless communicative 
theories furnish us with good reasons that can justify hard treatment in the communication 
of deserved censure, it seems they have failed in their task of explicating penal desert in 
terms of deserved censure.  
                                                 
10 That is true without even considering the more controversial kinds of legal punishments, such as life 
imprisonment without parole, solitary confinement and capital punishment. 
11 Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (n 1) 82. 
Of course, communicative theories might just very well be revisionary about our 
practice of legal punishment. This is not a problem in and of itself; but before we defend 
communicative theories as revisionary theories, notice how deeply revisionary they are in 
light of the problem of hard treatment. They do not just imply that our current practices of 
legal punishment are unjustifiable. They also imply, as suggested above, that legal 
punishment may consist of only formal convictions or purely symbolic punishments at the 
very most. Before we go down this revisionary route, it is worthwhile to investigate whether 
communicative theories need to be revisionary to that extent, or whether they can indeed 
furnish us with good reasons for some form of punitive hard treatment.12 
There are many responses to the problem of hard treatment; and many of the more 
prominent ones have already been critically assessed by others.13 Before considering Duff’s 
communicative theory as a response, I shall therefore only look at two other prominent 
responses which have yet to be discussed critically by others in relation to the problem of 
hard treatment. 
 
3. The Need to Distinguish the Culpable from the Non-culpable 
The first response focuses on censure understood as a kind of moral criticism. The problem 
here is that, according to Bennett, moral criticisms fail to distinguish between wrongdoers 
who are non-culpably ignorant and those who are culpable.14 In merely censuring offenders 
for their wrongdoings, we therefore fail to address and treat them as culpable wrongdoers 
properly. Bennett then goes on to argue that in order to do so properly, we also ought to 
                                                 
12 Not to mention that we can only adequately defend a revisionary theory, when we know how revisionary 
it is to start with.  
13 Hanna (n 9). 
14 Or in Bennett’s words, those who are qualified practitioners of the practice governed by the norms in 
question and those who are merely apprentices of the said practice. See his The Apology Ritual (n 1) 99-100. 
adopt retributive attitudes towards offenders, which in turn are expressed most 
appropriately by a proportionate suspension of their rights and liberties, together with the 
imposition of a proportionate level of amends.15 
Similar to Bennett’s view, the version of communicative theory that this paper seeks 
to defend also aims to justify punishment in terms of the amends that offenders ought to 
undertake for their crimes. Unlike Bennett’s view however, the primary reason for this is not 
the need to distinguish between those who are non-culpably ignorant and those who are 
culpable. This is because it is unclear why moral criticisms, even when they are only verbally 
conveyed, fail to distinguish between the two. If moral criticisms are understood to be 
something like “it was wrong for you (the offender) to have ø-ed”, then admittedly it is 
ambiguous between whether the offender culpably ø-ed or merely ø-ed out of non-culpable 
ignorance. Yet, there is no reason to think that moral criticisms must only take this simple 
and ambiguous form. Why can it not take the more complicated form of: “it was wrong for 
you to have ø-ed, and given you are a person with the necessary competent capacities, we 
expect that you could and should have known better”? As long as we criticize offenders in 
this more spelled out form, it makes clear to offenders (and anyone else for that matter) 
that we are addressing them as culpable wrongdoers. Had they been addressed as non-
culpably ignorant, the criticism would presumably be this instead: “it was wrong for you to 
have ø-ed, though we did not expect that you could or should have known better”. 
Indeed, it seems we can criticize offenders as culpable wrongdoers by making the 
moral criticisms against an appropriate background institutional practice, even when they 
are not spelled out as above. An example of this is formal convictions. If criminal trials 
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should be understood as a process of calling an alleged offender to answer for an alleged 
wrongdoing,16 then the formal convictions resulting from them can properly be understood 
as the kind of moral criticisms that address offenders as culpable wrongdoers. This is 
because to call someone to answer for violating a norm X, is to presume that he is bound by 
X, as someone who is expected to be guided by X when acting. It is because he has allegedly 
violated X despite this expectation that he needs to answer. Had he not been so expected, 
there would no need for him to answer for his actions, for what we then have is just the 
brute fact that he has allegedly violated X. In formally convicting an offender at the end of a 
criminal trial so understood, we are therefore criticizing him as a culpable wrongdoer; as 
someone who is expected to be guided by the norm he violated, but nevertheless failed to 
be guided by it without justification or excuse. 
Bennett’s argument therefore fails as a response to the problem of hard treatment. 
Merely censuring offenders for their wrongdoings can also properly address and treat them 
as culpable wrongdoers, and distinguish them from those who are only non-culpably 
ignorant, when the moral criticisms in question are spelled out as discussed above, or are 
made within an appropriate background institutional practice (e.g. our practice of formal 
convictions in criminal trials). As long as offenders are merely censured in these more 
specific ways, there is then no need also to inflict pains and burdens on offenders (in the 
form of a proportionate suspension of their rights and liberties and the imposition of a 
proportionate level of amends) just because of this requirement to address them as 
culpable wrongdoers. The problem of hard treatment therefore still remains despite 
Bennett’s argument. 
                                                 
16 Antony Duff, Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall and Victor Tadros, The Trial on Trial, vol 3 (Hart Publishing 
2007) ch 5. 
 4. Hard Treatment and Preventive Deterrence 
Rather than to take issue with censure being understood merely as a kind of moral criticism, 
the second response focuses on the aim(s) that can give us good reasons for at least some 
form of punitive hard treatment. One such aim that has been widely appealed to is 
preventive deterrence, which has been prominently developed and defended by von Hirsch 
and Ashworth.17 
This response basically admits that communicative theories, at least in the form I 
have presented so far, are incomplete justifications for legal punishment in light of the 
problem of hard treatment. Rather, the hard treatment in legal punishment, if it can be 
justified at all, is to be justified separately by appealing to the value of preventive 
deterrence, as a prudential supplement to the censure in question.  It therefore seeks to 
justify legal punishment on two separate grounds: the communication of deserved censure 
on the one hand, and preventive deterrence on the other. 
I do think that the appeal to preventive deterrence here answers the problem of 
hard treatment. What is unclear is that such a hybrid position is independently defensible to 
start with. 
One worry here concerns proportionality. If the justification of hard treatment in 
legal punishment rests solely on the value of preventive deterrence, then this would justify 
widely disproportionate punishment. This is because the severity of the punishments (i.e. 
the level of hard treatment) would then not be tied to the severity of the crimes in question. 
Rather, it would be tied to whatever level that is necessary to achieve the desired level of 
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deterrence. There is no reason to think that this necessarily corresponds to the severity of 
the crimes in question. 
This is not von Hirsch and Ashworth’s hybrid position, for they argue that the value 
of preventive deterrence ought only to operate within the framework of communicating 
censure. That is to say, as a prudential supplement that is to be justified in terms of 
preventive deterrence, hard treatment is not separate and independent from the censorial 
message that it seeks to reinforce. Rather, it forms part of the censorial message in 
question. A more severe level of hard treatment therefore implies a more severe censorial 
message, and vice versa for a milder level of hard treatment.18 
Von Hirsch and Ashworth’s hybrid position would therefore not end up justifying 
widely disproportionate punishment. Given that the censure offenders deserve for their 
crimes ought to reflect the severity of the crimes in question, by arguing that the hard 
treatment forms part of the censorial message itself, their hybrid position therefore 
connects the severity of the hard treatment in legal punishments with the severity of the 
crimes in question. A more severe crime X would therefore merit, under their position, a 
more severe level of hard treatment than a less severe crime Y; and insofar as crime X is 
more severe than crime Y by a certain proportion, then the level of hard treatment for crime 
X should also be more severe than the one for crime Y by the same proportion. 
However, even if their hybrid position respects ordinal proportionality (i.e. that 
punishments should be scaled according to the comparative seriousness of crimes), one 
might still worry that it does not necessarily respect cardinal proportionality.19 If increasing 
the severity of the hard treatments does indeed better serve the value of preventive 
                                                 
18 ibid 22-24 & 134-137. 
19 Tasioulas, ‘Punishment and Repentance’ (n 1) 292. 
deterrence, then there is no reason against doing so under this position, as long as this is 
done in a way that preserves ordinal proportionality. There is therefore no limit, for 
example, to the overall severity of a scale of hard treatments, as long as it is needed to 
achieve the desired level of deterrence, and the scale itself correctly corresponds to the 
comparative seriousness of crimes. Accordingly, while von Hirsch and Ashworth’s hybrid 
position would not end up justifying widely disproportionate punishment with regards to 
ordinal proportionality, it could do so with regards to cardinal proportionality. 
In response, it is unclear why it is not open for them to argue that certain kinds of 
hard treatments are just so severe that they are unjustifiable even when they better serve 
the value of preventive deterrence. It is arguable that extended solitary confinements, for 
example, are just so severe in nature that they ‘drown out’ the censure for any kind of 
criminal wrongdoing - in at least two senses: first, the prospects of being subjected to 
something this awful looms so large in one’s mind that one refrains from committing crimes 
just because of those prospects, rather than because the crimes in question are wrongs; and 
second, the pains and sufferings that they cause to those who are subjected to them, are 
just so severe that they displace whatever censorial message such hard treatments were 
intended to convey in the first place.20 Alternatively, one can also argue that the severity of 
extended solitary confinements constitutes a kind of ‘cruel and unusual punishment’, and 
for that reason is unjustifiable even if it better deters crimes. The same can also be said for 
                                                 
20 See von Hirsch & Ashworth (n 17) ch 2 fn n. I think this is the most plausible interpretation of the 
‘drowning out’ metaphor.   
lifelong imprisonment with no possibility of parole, if it does indeed violate the offenders’ 
‘right to hope’.21 
Of course, it is an open question whether any of the above kinds of arguments are 
sound. Yet, as long as von Hirsch and Ashworth can muster enough good arguments to rule 
out all instances of hard treatment that we intuitively regard with confidence as being too 
severe for even the most severe crime (e.g. extended solitary confinement etc.); and that 
moving down the scale to less severe crimes, respecting ordinal proportionality would not 
end up justifying something like imprisonment for a crime as minor as littering,22 then one 
would be hard-pressed to come up with examples that can convincingly show how their 
hybrid position fails with regards to cardinal proportionality. I therefore contend that we 
should be hesitant in rejecting their hybrid position for failing to account for cardinal 
proportionality. 
There is nevertheless a more intractable worry with their hybrid position; one that 
relates to their contention that hard treatment forms part of the censorial message in 
question. As explained earlier, it is this contention that allows their hybrid position to 
counter objections relating to proportionality; but this contention also leads to inconsistent 
claims about the severity of crimes under their position. 
Let us imagine a crime of burglary that is committed with a certain level of 
culpability and causes a certain level of harms to others. If we assume that at t1, short term 
imprisonment is needed to deter such burglaries to a tolerable level within the society in 
                                                 
21 Vinter and Others v UK App nos 66069/09, 130/10 & 3896/10 (ECHR, 9 July 2013). Note that unlike the 
‘drowning out’ argument, these two arguments appeal to independent considerations that are external to the 
consideration of censure that is inherent in von Hirsch and Ashworth’s hybrid position.  
22 Whether this is so depends on (a) how severe is the level of hard treatment that may be justified for the 
most severe crime, (b) the number of crimes between the most severe crime and the crime of littering, and (c) 
the relative seriousness of each crime lying between them. All other things being equal, the less severe (a) is, 
the higher the number is in (b) and the greater the relative seriousness is in (c), then the more likely 
imprisonment would not be justified for littering.  
question, then according to von Hirsch and Ashworth’s hybrid position, it would be 
justifiable to punish such burglaries with short term imprisonments at t1. Imagine that later 
at t2, the economic climate of that society (for example) has improved so much that now 
only non-custodial sentences are needed to keep such burglaries to a tolerable level. 
Accordingly, it is then unjustifiable to punish them with short term imprisonments at t2. 
Rather, punishment should be reduced to non-custodial sentences.23 The problem is that if 
hard treatment forms part of the censorial message in question, so that a more severe level 
of hard treatment implies a more severe censorial message (and vice versa for a milder level 
of hard treatment), and if the severity of the censorial message ought to reflect the severity 
of the crimes in question, then reducing the severity of the punishment for the burglaries at 
t2 would imply that the burglaries in t2 are less serious than the burglaries in t1. This seems 
absurd, for the burglaries in t1 and t2 are ex hypothesi exactly the same kind of criminal 
wrongs. They are committed with the same level of culpability and cause the same level of 
harms to others. As such, they are therefore of the same level of seriousness. It is just that 
they are committed at different times. 
More generally, there is therefore a tension between the following two claims within 
von Hirsch and Ashworth’s hybrid position: (a) hard treatment forms part of the censorial 
message in question, so that a more severe hard treatment implies a more serious crime 
and vice versa for a milder hard treatment; and (b) hard treatment is to be justified in terms 
of preventive deterrence. Insofar as they hold (b), then the level of hard treatment for a 
given crime can fluctuate depending what is needed to serve the value of preventive 
deterrence best. If they also hold (a), then this fluctuation would translate into claims about 
                                                 
23 For this to satisfy ordinal proportionality, most probably the whole scale of punishments would have to 
be reduced correspondingly. This would be warranted if the kind of effect that we are imagining here about 
the improved economic climate extends to other crimes as well. 
the severity of crimes, leading to the kind of inconsistent claims that I have illustrated in the 
above. To avoid this result, von Hirsch and Ashworth must therefore reject either (a) or (b). 
However, if they forgo (a), then their position would be susceptible to objections relating to 
proportionality; and if they forgo (b), then they would have no response to the problem of 
hard treatment. Either way, their hybrid position would become untenable. For these 
reasons, we should therefore reject it and seek an alternative response to the problem of 
hard treatment. 
 
5. Hard Treatment and Penance 
This then takes us to Duff’s communicative theory. Just like the above second response to 
the problem of hard treatment, this one also focuses on identifying certain aims that can 
give us good reasons for at least some form of punitive hard treatment. Yet unlike that one, 
it denies (b) and insists that the communicative theory of punishment is indeed a complete 
justification of legal punishment. Rather than seeing hard treatment as separate from the 
communication of deserved censure, and therefore requiring a separate justification in its 
own right, we should see it as part of the communicative process suitably understood.  
More specifically, according to Duff, we should understand legal punishment as a 
form of secular penance which aims at ‘three R’s’ – repentance, reform and reconciliation, 
and that these aims are to be pursued by a communicative process of censure involving the 
imposition of hard treatment. The hope is that through such a communicative process, 
offenders can then be persuaded and come to repent for their crimes, try to reform 
themselves, and reconcile themselves with those they have wronged, precisely by 
undergoing the burden of the hard treatment in question.24 Hard treatment therefore has 
two roles to play in relation to these ‘three R’s’. First, it serves to induce offenders to come 
to repent, reform themselves and reconcile with those whom they have wronged; and 
second, it serves as a vehicle through which offenders come to do so. Accordingly, once we 
understand the communicative theory of punishment in terms of secular penance with the 
‘three R’s’ as its aims, then hard treatment is also within the reach of its justificatory power. 
In what follows, I shall focus more on the aim of repentance than on the other two 
aims. This is because, as it will become clear later on, self-reform is part of repentance 
broadly construed, and the aim of reconciliation is to be pursued through the aim of 
repentance. 
We also need to be clear at the outset just exactly what kind of hard treatment is 
being justified under Duff’s communicative theory. Given the stated aim of repentance, one 
might be tempted to identify the hard treatment that is being justified here in terms of the 
pains and burdens that come along with repentance; the emotional toils of guilt, for 
example, that result from recognizing that one has done a wrong. This is a mistake, for hard 
treatment is here understood as a kind of burden that is (among its other roles) placed on 
an offender to induce him to repent for his crimes. Insofar as this constitutes a kind of 
suffering, it is an external one that is different from whatever internal suffering might result 
from his recognition that he has done a wrong. It is therefore a straw man to criticize Duff’s 
communicative theory on the basis that under his view, hard treatment is just the suffering 
that comes along with repentance.25 
                                                 
24 Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (n 1) 106-112. 
25 cf Hanna (n 9) 142-148. 
One prominent objection to Duff’s communicative theory is that it just seems 
improper for the state to try to induce and elicit repentance from offenders. This objection 
is based on the idea that in doing so, the state seems to be doing something that an abbot 
would be doing in a monastery, when he imposes penance on sinners so that they come to 
repent and expiate their sins, and thereby achieve absolution and salvation. Thus despite 
Duff’s claim that it is a secular form of penance, it is unclear that this is something a secular 
liberal democratic state like ours should be doing when responding to crimes.26 
There are in fact two issues raised in this objection; and it would be best to 
distinguish them from each other. The first one concerns whether the aim of inducing and 
eliciting repentance from offenders is itself a proper one for a liberal democratic state; and 
the second one is about the proposed means that are to be used in the pursuit of that aim: 
whether it is proper for a liberal democratic state to burden offenders with hard treatment 
(just as the penance imposed by the abbot burdens the sinner) to induce offenders to 
repent for their crimes. Ultimately, it is the second issue that poses the most significant 
challenge to Duff’s communicative theory; but let us look at the first issue to start with. 
If we understand the aim of inducing repentance from offenders in religious terms, 
as when the aim is to induce them to repent for their sins so that they could achieve 
salvation and absolution from God, then it seems flatly inconsistent with the liberal 
commitments to state neutrality; but it is not clear why it can only be understood in 
religious terms.27 To start with, when it comes to the state, the kind of repentance that we 
are aiming to induce from offenders is not repentance for their sins (whatever that might 
be), but for their crimes. Let us therefore assume, for the purposes of this argument, that a 
                                                 
26 von Hirsch & Ashworth (n 17) 93-97. 
27 See also John Tasioulas, ‘Repentance and the Liberal State’ (2007) 4 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 
487, 506-507 & 513-518.  
liberal state is justified in enacting the crimes in question, to declare the types of conduct 
under consideration as wrongful and therefore as something that all members of the state 
should not do.28 We can then understand the kind of repentance that the state is aiming to 
induce from offenders here as precisely the recognition and judgement that what they have 
done is an instance of such wrongful conducts, and is therefore something that they should 
not have done. If the state is justified in marking out and declaring an offender’s conduct as 
a wrong, it is unclear why the state may not also aim for the offender to come to recognize 
and judge that his conduct is wrong. Furthermore, there is no further requirement here that 
offenders come to this recognition and judgement for the right reasons (whatever they 
might be). As Tasioulas points out, “a repentant murderer… need not be able to offer a 
correct account, or indeed any half-way plausible account, of why murder is wrong. When 
he does have such an account, it suffices if it falls within certain broad limits of intelligibility 
– a divine command explanation would count as such, even for an atheist”.29 The state 
therefore is not here aiming for offenders to come to recognize and judge that their conduct 
is wrong for the same reasons as the state (or anyone else’s reasons for that matter). 
Rather, it is merely aiming for them to come to do so for whatever intelligible reasons they 
so happen to hold.  
Of course, repentance is a complex moral response involving a number of different 
elements; and the recognition and judgement that what one has done is a wrong is only one 
of them. 30 Yet, this recognition and judgement is the more foundational element in the 
sense that it is the element from which we can come to see the relevance of the other 
elements in repentance.  It is by coming to recognize and judge that one has done a wrong, 
                                                 
28 The conditions under which this is the case will depend on our normative theory of criminalization. 
29 ibid 488. 
30 Ibid 488-489. 
that one sees the need to apologize and make reparations (if there are any) for the wrong 
that one has done. It is also in light of this recognition and judgement that one comes to see 
the need to reform oneself, to resolve not to commit such a wrong again and overcome (if 
there were any) moral defects that led to one’s original wrongdoing. It is also in virtue of 
such a recognition and judgement that one is disposed to experience the emotions of guilt 
and shame that are typical of repentance. Nevertheless, what exactly is being aimed at here 
by the state, when it aims to induce offenders to repent for their crimes, is precisely this 
more foundational element of their coming to recognize and judge that what they have 
done is a wrong; and not, for example, the emotions of guilt and shame that supervene on 
such judgements. It is through aiming at this more foundational element that the state aims 
to bring an offender to repent for their crimes in the fuller sense described above. Provided 
that a liberal democratic state was justified in enacting the crimes in question, then as long 
as what the state is aiming to induce from offenders for their crimes is repentance in this 
more specific sense, there is no reason to think that this aim itself is an improper one for a 
liberal democratic state. If there is an impropriety here, it is about the means and the extent 
to which the state may induce repentance from offenders for their crimes. This takes us to 
the second issue raised by the original objection. 
The worry here is that, as it currently stands, it is just not clear what exactly is the 
hard treatment that is justifiable to burden offenders with under Duff’s communicative 
theory. It certainly cannot be whatever best induces offenders to repent for their crimes. If 
this was the case, then it could end up justifying widely disproportionate punishment; for 
the severity of punishment would then be tied to how ‘thick-skinned’ an offender is, and not 
to the severity of the crimes in question. 
There are two aspects to the above worry that need to be addressed. The first 
concerns the duration of hard treatment; i.e. just how long is it justifiable to burden an 
offender with a particular kind of hard treatment in order to induce his repentance? The 
second concerns the kind of hard treatment in question; i.e. just what exactly is the 
appropriate kind of hard treatment that is justifiable to burden an offender with for his 
particular crime? 
Duff addresses both questions. With regard to the second one, he argues that we 
should focus on the meanings of particular kinds of punishment; and ask, what kinds are, in 
light of their meanings, appropriate for the crimes in question.31  Thus to take imprisonment 
as an example, Duff argues that ‘[t]he message of imprisonment is that the offender has not 
just damaged or threatened, but has broken, the normative bonds of the community’.32 It is 
therefore only appropriate for crimes whose nature involves breaking the normative bonds 
of the community in question. 
One worry about this response is that this would then make ‘the appropriate kind of 
hard treatment’ depend on the kind of account that we hold for the nature of crimes. If all 
crimes are, according to some social contract theories,33 wrongs that violate the terms of 
the social contract of the political community in question, then arguably all crimes involve 
breaking ‘the normative bonds’ of the community in question. This would then lead to the 
rather implausible conclusion that imprisonment is appropriate for all crimes, regardless of 
their severity as wrongs. 
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Of course, one can respond to this by rejecting the above social contract account of 
crimes,34 or by arguing that there is a difference between 'violating the terms of the social 
contract' and 'breaking the normative bonds' of the community in question. Even if that is 
the case, the first question about the duration of hard treatment still remains; and it is even 
more unclear that Duff's response is adequate here. 
Duff argues that we should only do so much when it comes to inducing offenders to 
repent for their crimes. This is because to properly respect them as responsible autonomous 
agents, we should leave them room in the end to not accept, and therefore not come to 
judge and recognize that they have done wrongs, despite our best efforts to persuade them 
otherwise.35 This rings true to me; but it is unclear, according to this argument, just when 
we are doing more than we should. 
As the above brief discussion shows, Duff needs to say more to address properly the 
second issue raised by the original objection. Instead of elaborating and defending Duff’s 
responses, I shall explore another response in the following; one that I believe is more 
adequate in defending Duff’s communicative theory from the above worries. 
 
6. Hard Treatment and Amends 
According to this response, when thinking about what is the appropriate hard treatment 
that is justifiable to burden offenders with in order to induce their repentance, we should 
focus more specifically on what offenders ought to do in light of their crimes; or in other 
words, the secondary responsibilities that they have in virtue of violating their primary 
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responsibilities.36 Given the limited space here, I am unable to offer a complete theory 
about what offenders ought to do in light of their crimes. I contend, however, that a 
plausible theory would have to account for the intuition that offenders should at least 
apologize for their wrongdoing, and that this apology should not merely be verbal, but 
should take a certain material form. In other words, it should involve reparations for one’s 
wrongdoing, where this involves not just material reparations for the harms that result from 
one’s wrongdoing; but also moral reparations for the fact that one committed a wrong, as 
opposed to merely having non-culpably caused harms.  I shall refer to all these collectively 
as the ‘amends’ that offenders ought to make to apologize for their wrongdoing. 
It is precisely in terms of such amends that we should understand the ‘hard 
treatment’ in Duff’s communicative theory. That is to say, the kind of ‘hard treatment’ that 
we should burden offenders with to induce them to repent for their crimes is precisely the 
amends that they ought to make to apologize for their wrongdoing. According to this view, 
we should therefore start with an account of the amends that offenders ought to make to 
apologize for their crimes. Once that account is in place, the kind of hard treatment that we 
should burden offenders with to induce their repentance is then precisely the amends that 
are identified by such an account. 
Under this view, the hard treatment that we should burden an offender with for his 
particular crime therefore depends on what exactly are the amends that he ought to make 
to apologize for his particular wrongdoing. Answering this requires a complete theory of 
amends. Although I am unable to offer one here due to limited space, I see reconciliation as 
the aim of apologies, and that the amends a wrongdoer ought to make to apologize for his 
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wrongdoing are to be determined by what he reasonably ought to do to merit reconciliation 
with those whom he has wronged, and the wider community whose norm he has violated.37 
In the context of criminal wrongdoings, the latter then refers to the political community 
whose crime the offender has committed. Even in the absence of a complete theory of 
amends, there are already goods reasons in favour of the view I have been arguing for. 
First, there is a clear story under this view for why the hard treatment in question is 
appropriate, and it is therefore justifiable to burden an offender with it to induce his 
repentance. This is because the hard treatment in question, as a means for inducing an 
offender’s repentance, is now not merely something that is external to and different from 
what an offender ought to do in light of his wrongdoing. Rather, it is constituted precisely by 
the amends that he ought to make in light of his wrongdoing. In other words, we are here 
burdening him with what he ought to do (i.e. the amends in question) to induce him to do 
what he ought to do (i.e. repent for his crimes). Insofar as such amends are also part of 
repentance broadly understood, then the means used to pursue the aim of repentance 
under this view can also be said to be internal to the aim in question.  
Understanding hard treatment in this way also supports the second role that Duff’s 
communicative theory accords to hard treatment, i.e. it serves as a vehicle through which 
offenders come to repent and reconcile with those whom they have wronged. This is 
because it is through such amends, when they are undertaken with the right spirit (i.e. with 
the recognition and judgement that one has done a wrong),38 that offenders come to repent 
(in the broader sense) for their crimes and reconcile with those whom they have wronged.39 
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Proportionality is also built into the justification of punishment under this view. This 
is because it is plausible to think that the amends an offender ought to make to apologize 
for his crime should be proportionate to the nature and severity of his crime. A more 
burdensome and extensive set of amends is therefore required to apologize for a more 
serious crime, and vice versa for a less serious crime. Since the hard treatment in legal 
punishment is precisely, according to this view, the amends that an offender ought to make 
to apologize for his criminal wrongdoing, this requirement of proportionality is therefore 
transferred over to the justification of punishment. 
Finally, and more importantly for the purposes of this paper, understanding hard 
treatment in this way also allows us to respond more adequately to the above challenges to 
Duff’s communicative theory. To start with, a particular kind of hard treatment is now 
appropriate not simply because its meaning somehow corresponds to, reflects or captures 
the nature of the crime in question; but because they are precisely the amends that one 
should make to apologize for one’s criminal wrongdoing. Even if all crimes are wrongs that 
violate the terms of the social contract of the political community in question, it does not 
follow necessarily that severing one’s ‘normative bonds’ with the community in question is 
the most appropriate amends that one should make to apologize for them. More 
importantly, this view has a clear answer to the question ‘just when we are doing more than 
we should?’. If, according to our best account, the amends that an offender ought to make 
to apologize for his particular crime are X, then according to this view, X is precisely the 
most we can burden an offender with to induce his repentance. Even if the offender 
remains unrepentant after he has undergone or undertaken X, we are not allowed to 
burden him more with X+1. 
 
7. Three Potential Objections 
In the following, I shall consider three immediate objections to the above view. Given the 
limited space here, my aim is not to refute all of them decisively; but to show that there are 
at least plausible responses to each of them. 
The first objection alleges that it is senseless to burden unrepentant offenders with 
the amends they ought to make to apologize for their crimes.40 This is because apologies 
have a certain voluntary aspect to them; and they need to come from within the agents who 
are doing the apologizing. If unrepentant offenders make the amends in question merely 
because they are burdened by it, this would then undermine what they do as apologies for 
their wrongdoing. 
The first thing to note in response to this objection is that burdening offenders with 
the amends in question does not necessarily preclude the possibility of their coming to 
recognize and judge for themselves that they have indeed done a wrong, and thus perform 
the amends in a way that would constitute genuine apologies. Indeed, the aim behind 
burdening offenders in this way is precisely to induce such a recognition and judgement. 
More importantly, the above objection only holds for those who argue that simply in virtue 
of making the amends in question, offenders have therefore apologized for their criminal 
wrongdoings and reconciled themselves with those whom they have wronged.41 The view 
that has been defended here is, however, not committed to this. It is open to the possibility 
that a (persistent) offender might very well remain unrepentant despite being burdened by 
the amends in question; and that in virtue of this, the amends that he has made therefore 
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do not constitute an apology for his wrongdoing. It is just that we are now not allowed to 
impose on him additional burdens to induce his repentance further. Under this view, it is 
only in the specific sense that he should not be subjected to further punishment, that an 
offender can be said to have ‘reconciled’ himself with others simply in virtue of performing 
the amends that he has been burdened with.42   
There might be another objection relating to recalcitrant offenders in the vicinity 
here. If it turns out as a matter of fact that burdening them with the hard treatment in 
question actually undermines their prospects of coming to repent for their crimes, so that 
we would have done better in relation to this aim had we not burdened them with it, then 
this seems to undercut our justification for the hard treatment in question. This is because 
in such a case, the justifying aim in question is precisely undermined by the hard treatment 
that it is intended to justify in the first place.  
There are certainly reasons to think that hard treatment can, as it turns out, 
undermine the aim of inducing repentance in offenders. As Narayan points out, insofar as 
the hard treatment in question involves material and liberty deprivations, these will ‘often 
have the effect of focusing one’s attention on one’s own suffering’; and thus ‘shift the 
agent’s attention from the nature of her previous wrongdoing to the nature of her current 
hardship’. Furthermore, insofar as they are imposed on offenders as opposed to being 
undertaken voluntarily by them, this will likely ‘result in anger and a hardening of the 
heart’.43 
Nevertheless, there are also reasons to think otherwise; for it also depends on what 
exactly is the kind of hard treatment that is under consideration here. If it is conceived as 
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something that is rather harsh and severe in kind, and inflicted on an offender simply as a 
way to induce him to repent, then it does seem likely that the hard treatment will turn out 
to have the effects envisioned above. However, if they are conceived in the way that I have 
been arguing for, in terms of the amends that offenders ought to make to apologize for 
their wrongdoing, then this might make it less likely. This is because there is a rational 
connection between the hard treatment in question and the offender’s previous 
wrongdoing, i.e. that it is precisely the amends that he ought to make to apologize for the 
wrong that he has committed. The hope is that through such a connection, an offender who 
is initially focused on his current hardship (of being subjected to the hard treatment in 
question) can then upon reflection come to focus on the wrong that he has committed; for 
his current hardship is, according to this connection, the upshot of the amends that he 
ought to make to apologize for his wrongdoing. Similarly, insofar as an offender resents the 
fact that the hard treatment in question is imposed on him, the hope is also that through 
this connection, he can come to see that what is now imposed on him is precisely what he in 
any case ought to be doing to apologize for his wrongdoing;44 that we are imposing on him 
precisely the burdens that morality already imposes on and requires of him. 
Whether or not the hard treatment that I have been arguing for will turn out to 
undermine the aim of repentance is of course an empirical question. Insofar as there is (as 
yet) no clear answer to this, what I have been trying to show here is that while there are 
general reasons to think that hard treatment might turn out to undermine the aim of 
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repentance, there are also reasons to think otherwise, especially when we conceive of hard 
treatment in the way that I have been arguing for.  
There is also another reason that is worth mentioning here. Subjecting a recalcitrant 
offender to the hard treatment which aims at inducing his repentance also expresses the 
recognition that he is not beyond hope; that despite his current recalcitrance, he is still seen 
as capable of seeing and judging that what he has done was wrong (and may eventually 
come to see and to judge that for himself). It therefore expresses a certain kind of 
recognition respect,45 one that involves seeing the recalcitrant offender as someone who is 
nevertheless responsive to reasons; and that while he is now recalcitrant, he will eventually 
come to recognize that he has done a wrong by being required to make the amends that he 
ought to make to apologize for his wrongdoing.46 Unless we know in advance that a 
particular recalcitrant offender’s prospect of repentance is necessarily undermined by the 
hard treatment in question, this therefore constitutes another reason in favour of subjecting 
him to it with the aim of inducing his repentance. 
Of course, much more needs to be said about this recognition respect.47 However, as 
explained before, what I want to do here (and all that I can hope to do) is to show that while 
there is force to this objection concerning recalcitrant offenders, it is not necessarily 
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decisive against the communicative theory I am defending here; for there are, as I have tried 
to illustrate, some plausible responses to it. 
The second objection alleges that if the aim of burdening offenders with the amends 
in question is to induce them to repent for their crimes, then this seems unnecessary for the 
offender who is already repentant at the point of conviction.48 
We need to be clear about what we mean by an ‘already-repentant’ offender here. If 
by this, we are merely referring to an offender who only comes to recognize and judge that 
he has done a wrong, I see no objection here. What we are requiring of and burdening him 
with is precisely the amends that he ought to make to apologize for his wrongdoing. It is 
therefore something that he presumably should recognize as what he ought to do in coming 
to recognize and judge that he has done a wrong.49 Since the amends in question are also 
supposedly part of repentance (in the fuller sense discussed before), hard treatment so 
understood therefore still plays its second role here, for it provides a vehicle through which 
such an ‘already-repentant’ offender can come to repent fully for their crimes. It is just that, 
as opposed to the unrepentant offender, it is now not needed to serve its first role of 
inducing an offender to recognize and judge that he has done a wrong. 
The same can also be said for an ‘already-repentant’ offender who has done 
something to apologize for his crime prior to conviction, but not exactly the amends he 
ought to make to apologize for his crime.  If there is a worry here, it is about who has the 
right to determine exactly what an offender ought to do to apologize for his crimes. 
However, if an argument can be made for the state’s authority to determine what exactly 
counts as a criminal wrong, it is not clear why the same argument cannot also be made for 
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what an offender ought to do to apologize for committing such criminal wrongs. Insofar as 
there is an objection here, it is therefore not one that is distinctive to the communicative 
view that is being defended here. Rather, it is more generally about the state’s right to 
determine what members of the political community in question owe towards each other. 
What about the kind of ‘already-repentant’ offender who, unlike the above two 
kinds, has already made precisely the amends he ought to make to apologize for his crimes? 
I think this also does not pose a problem to my view. As I explained in the beginning, 
communicative theories (as I understand them, of which my view is one kind) seek to 
explain, in terms of the censure that offenders deserve in virtue of their crimes, just why it is 
justified in the pro tanto sense to punish them. I therefore maintain that in virtue of their 
crimes, such ‘already-repentant’ offenders do deserve to be punished in the way I have 
been arguing for, and that this punishment is thus justified in the pro tanto sense. 
Nevertheless, it might still be unjustified all-things-considered because such offenders have 
already made precisely the amends they ought to make to apologize for their crimes. 
Whether that is the case depends on whether we should take into account offenders’ post-
offence behavior in deciding what is the all-things-considered justified punishment. I think 
we should, though properly defending this is beyond the scope of this paper.50 The point 
here is just that given it is only concerned with pro tanto justification, my communicative 
view is therefore not necessarily committed to punishing an offender even when he has 
already made precisely the amends he ought to make to apologize for his crime.  
The third and final objection questions whether my communicative view can account 
for legal punishments that involve liberty deprivations. To the extent that the kind of 
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amends we typically think of, which wrongdoers ought to make to apologize for their 
wrongdoings, involve certain kinds of positive duties (e.g. compensation and certain 
reparative work), my communicative view can account for those legal punishments that also 
involve the imposition of certain positive duties (e.g. community payback orders, fines and 
penalties). Such punishments are and should be, according to my view, the kinds of 
compensatory or reparative duties that constitute (at least partly) the kind of amends that 
an offender ought to make to apologize for his wrongdoing. However, what about those 
legal punishments that involve liberty deprivations (e.g. restriction orders, house arrests and 
imprisonments)? 
I think my communicative view can also account for those punishments. There are 
reasons to think that alongside certain positive duties, liberty deprivations can also 
sometimes be an appropriate part of the amends in question (or more accurately restricting 
one’s own liberties, since we are talking in terms of the amends that wrongdoers ought to 
make here). Through restricting one’s liberties, or more specifically refraining, distancing or 
removing oneself from the kind of activities that one normally does or takes for granted in 
everyday life, one shows that one has taken the time, effort, energy, attention and space to 
reflect, think through and face up to the wrong that one has culpably done, as one is 
diverted away and removed from the ordinary routines of everyday life. When the activities 
in question are part of the context of one’s culpable wrongdoing, doing so also expresses 
the recognition that one has culpably violated a norm that makes such activities possible for 
everyone (including oneself). This is especially the case when the wrong is serious and the 
stakes in violations are particularly high, for it involves seeing oneself as being in some sense 
temporarily “disqualified” from the activity in question, at least during and at most until one 
has undertaken the reparations that constitute the apology that one should undertake in 
light of one’s culpable wrongdoing. A deep and remorseful apologetic response should 
involve such kinds of recognitions.  
Of course, when and under what conditions liberty deprivations are part of the 
amends in question, and what kinds are proportionate to what crimes, can only be 
answered with a complete theory of amends. The point is just that insofar as liberty 
deprivations can also sometimes be a proper part of the amends that wrongdoers ought to 
make to apologize for their wrongdoings, there is room within my communicative view to 
account for legal punishments that involve liberty deprivations. 
Even if all this is true, however, it is still an open question whether imprisonment as 
it is currently practiced (for example) in the UK can be justifiable under my communicative 
view. This is because convicted offenders are simply taken from courts to prisons. Insofar as 
this is something that is simply done to offenders, it is hard to see how it can be understood 
as something that an offender ought to do in light of his wrongdoing, as part of the amends 
that he ought to make to apologize for it. For this reason, my communicative view would 
find more justifiable kinds of imprisonment where it is more plausible to see the liberty 
deprivations as something that an offender does as part of what he ought to do to apologize 
for his wrongdoing. Examples of such imprisonments include sentences that require an 
offender to report on a certain date to a certain prison to serve his term, or sentences of 
intermittent imprisonment (e.g. weekend imprisonments) which also require an offender to 
report for his imprisonment.51  
Admittedly, much more needs to be said about the plausibility and feasibility of such 
‘open’ prisons. For example, whether they would create a perverse incentive for offenders 
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to abscond just because other offenders do so, and how that should be best mitigated.52 
Furthermore, none of what I have discussed necessarily implies that imprisonment as it is 
currently practiced in the UK can never be justifiable. It all depends on whether there are 
good enough reasons to justify departing from the kinds of imprisonment that are endorsed 
by my communicative view. What I merely want to do in this section is simply (a) to show 
that the kind of communicative theory defended here does not necessarily rule out all kinds 
of imprisonment as unjustifiable, just because they involve liberty deprivation; and (b) to 
briefly describe the kinds of imprisonment that best exemplifies the commitments of this 
communicative theory.  
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper seeks to defend a particular version of the communicative theory in light of the 
problem of hard treatment. This particular version follows Duff in arguing that the hard 
treatment in legal punishment can be justified in relation to the aim of repentance, more 
specifically by inducing offenders to repent for their crimes and by providing a vehicle in 
which they come to do so. Yet, it also argues that the hard treatment in question should be 
more appropriately understood in terms of the amends that offenders ought to make to 
apologize for their criminal wrongdoings. This paper then considers three potential 
objections to this particular version of communicative theory, the first two of which were 
originally advanced against Duff’s version of it. It argues that the version of communicative 
theory defended in this paper has plausible responses to each of them.  
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